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THE FUTURE OF DIRECT FINANCE: THE DIVERGING 
PATHS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND 
KICKSTARTER 
Kathryn Judge∗ 
This Article explores why the technologies that have transformed 
a range of industries by facilitating a dramatic rise in direct 
transactions—as reflected in the rapid growth of eBay, Etsy, and 
Airbnb, among others—have yet to similarly transform banking and 
other modes of financial intermediation.  Its primary focus is the 
evolution of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) lending from a sector that promised 
to bring similarly radical changes to financial intermediation to one 
in which the relationship between the supplier and recipient of the 
capital is increasingly attenuated.  The analysis reveals a number of 
market and regulatory forces that tend to favor intermediation and 
work against direct finance when the exchange is purely financial.  
Yet the Article also considers areas where direct finance appears to be 
gaining more of a toehold.  This examination reveals ways that 
technology is increasingly enabling capital raising to be bundled 
with other undertakings, like garnering publicity or gathering 
information about the demand for a potential project.  The analysis 
suggests that when the exchange involves more than just capital, 
direct finance may yet thrive, as individuals can bring attributes to 
the table that intermediaries cannot readily replicate.   
The conjecture that direct finance is most likely to be viable when 
the provision of capital is part of a thicker bundle, while inherently 
speculative, has ramifications for both theory and policy.  Such a 
development runs contrary to the prevailing wisdom that innovations 
will lead to ever greater specialization and result in capital raising 
being increasingly divorced from risk bearing and other 
commitments.  It also presents an interesting regulatory challenge, as 
thicker bundles are more likely to raise policy and legal issues 
traditionally addressed through disparate bodies of law and often 
enforced by agencies with different aims and inclinations. 
 
 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School.  
The author is grateful to Mariana Pargendler, Fred Benenson, and participants 
at the Wake Forest Law Review Symposium on the Future of Financial 
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Introduction 
For centuries, the trend has been toward longer and more 
complex intermediation chains in a wide array of contexts.1  The 
growing length and complexity of intermediation chains were both 
the byproducts and drivers of ever-greater globalization and 
specialization.  In recent years, however, there has been a shift in 
the opposite direction.2  In a wide array of markets, suppliers and 
consumers increasingly transact directly with one another.  Many of 
these developments have arisen from technological innovations that 
reduce search costs and other hurdles to transacting, like verifying 
information and negotiating the terms of a transaction.  Airbnb, 
Etsy, and their kin, for example, so lower transaction costs as to 
enable a wide range of transactions to occur that would have been 
unimaginable a mere decade ago.  Bedrooms that previously sat 
empty are now regularly occupied by a rotating cast of short-term 
visitors; artisans can now make a living by reaching would-be 
clients in faraway places. 
Other forces that seem to be contributing to the rise of direct 
transactions are changing consumer preferences and growing 
appreciation for the ways that the nature of the intermediation 
chain separating a consumer and a producer affects the nature of 
the goods produced.  For example, the dramatic resurgence of 
farmers’ markets seems to reflect growing consumer demand for 
foods that are locally and organically produced and consumer 
appreciation of the fact that the vegetables available at a farmers’ 
market are different than those one can get at the average grocery 
store.3 
Shifting the focus to finance, one can find signs of both of these 
trends.  For example, the strong interest in P2P lending following 
the 2007–2009 financial crisis seemed to be a byproduct of both new 
technologies that could facilitate the ability of individual borrowers 
and lenders to connect directly with one another and a heightened 
distrust of banks.  As explained in 2007 by the co-founder of a 
leading P2P lending platform, Prosper, “there’s a growing trend 
toward ‘people taking care of other people and a growing trend away 
 
 1. See Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 421, 427–30 (2013) (discussing the development of markets and 
later banks as intermediation channels). 
 2. See infra Subpart I.A. 
 3.  E.g., Stephen Vogel, Number of U.S. Farmers’ Markets Continues to 
Rise, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://ers.usda.gov/data-
products/chart-
gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=48561&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=373
73 (last updated Aug. 4, 2014) (“The number of farmers’ markets rose to 8,284 
in 2014, up from 3,706 in 2004 and 1,755 in 1994.”).  Etsy also embodies this 
growing consumer trend toward direct transactions.  See Hiroko Tabuchi, 
Armies of Artisans, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2015, at B1. 
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from reliance on corporations, banks[,] and large institutions.”4  He 
viewed P2P lending as embodying the promise of this new era.   
P2P lending has taken off, but in the process it has evolved to 
become both more like and more reliant on the large financial 
intermediaries it originally promised to supplant.  Yet time has also 
revealed other niches where true direct finance seems to be 
flourishing.  By exploring how and why P2P lending has evolved and 
comparing that evolution to these other domains, this paper 
explores the intertwined questions of the benefits financial 
intermediaries provide and when direct interactions between the 
suppliers and recipients of capital might be able to create value in 
excess of the benefits that reliance on intermediaries can confer. 
While speculative, the analysis here suggests that direct finance is 
likely to thrive only when the exchange of capital—a good that is 
fungible—is coupled with the exchange of other goods that are not—
such as feedback about the value consumers place on a proposed 
project or the ability to support the creation of a public good not 
easily financed through other mechanisms.      
To separate hope from reality, it is necessary to begin by 
considering the promise that P2P lending seemed to embody when it 
first emerged. Early advocates depicted P2P lending as poised to 
fundamentally transform multiple dimensions of the lending 
process.  With respect to the providers of capital, P2P held out the 
promise of providing ordinary individuals the opportunity to invest 
directly in unsecured loans, an activity that historically belonged 
almost exclusively to banks.  It was simultaneously heralded as 
potentially expanding the pool of persons who could obtain credit, 
enabling persons who might not readily qualify for a bank loan to 
nonetheless obtain needed financing.5  In addition to altering the 
providers and recipients of credit, P2P promised to transform the 
nature of the relationship between these ends of the investment 
chain, directly connecting retail lenders to those receiving their 
funds.6 
While the industry has grown dramatically in recent years, its 
promise along each of these dimensions has diminished at an 
equally rapid clip.  The lender base has shifted from consisting 
almost exclusively of individuals making modest investments to now 
being dominated by large institutional investors.7  The individual 
investors that remain increasingly rely on automated tools to 
 
 4. Pamela Yip, Person-to-Person Lending Is Networking Its Way Up, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, at 1D, 2007 WLNR 24391872 (quoting 
John Witchel). 
 5.  See infra Subpart I.A.   
 6.  See infra Subpart I.A. 
 7.  Nav Athwal, The Disappearance of Peer-to-Peer Lending, FORBES (Oct. 
14, 2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/14/the-
disappearance-of-peer-to-peer-lending/; see also infra Subpart I.B.  
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allocate their funds, eliminating personalized review of the specifics 
of each loan request.8  At the same time, platforms have become 
increasingly discriminating in the borrowers they allow to seek 
funds, and the metrics that platforms use to make this 
determination are strongly correlated to those long used by banks 
and other credit providers.9  Coupled with the changing lender base, 
the result is that would-be borrowers are now evaluated in ways 
akin to banks’ traditional underwriting processes, and the borrower 
base consists largely of borrowers able to get credit 
elsewhere.  Finally, because of changes triggered by regulatory 
concerns, P2P loans no longer create a direct relationship between 
lenders and borrowers even when the capital comes from an 
individual.  Instead, lenders typically receive an unsecured claim 
against the P2P platform, the value of which is set by reference to 
the performance of the associated loan.  Other changes in P2P 
platforms are further blurring the bounds between these platforms 
and traditional financial intermediaries.10  In short, P2P platforms 
have become a link in complex, highly intermediated chains that 
bear little resemblance to the potential they once embodied. 
While far from conclusive, the evolution of P2P lending does not 
bode well for the future of widespread direct finance.  While the 
changes in P2P lending may be due in part to efforts by established 
intermediaries to use their informational and positional advantages 
to entrench their positions in socially suboptimal ways, they may 
also reflect the genuine gains that specialized intermediaries can 
provide when the exchange is purely financial.11 Data-driven 
algorithms have proven relatively effective at assessing borrower 
creditworthiness and the limited data suggest that individuals are 
unlikely to have any natural advantages in this process.12  The 
regulatory intervention, while potentially poorly executed, was also 
motivated by legitimate concerns about investor protection.11   The 
changes in P2P lending may also indicate that when acting solely as 
a borrower or lender, individuals care more about the expected cost 
of a loan or return on their investment than they do about the 
nature of their relationship to the party on the side.   
This account is positive, not normative, and it does not discount 
the potential for technology to transform and improve lending 
 
 8.  See infra Subpart I.B. 
 9.  See infra Subpart I.B. 
 10.  E.g., Athwal, supra note 7 (stating that “institutions have managed to 
infiltrate this once retail industry from every angle”—including taking board 
seats on and investing in the major P2P platforms—and noting that 
institutional investors now provide “80–90% of the capital deployed through 
Prosper and Lending Club,” the two leading P2P platforms); see also infra 
Subpart I.B. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See infra Subpart II.A. 
11 See infra Subpart II.B. 
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practices.  While P2P lending has not changed intermediation in the 
ways many first hoped, its rapid growth suggests that P2P 
platforms can serve as a useful mechanism for credit creation.  The 
particular niches where P2P lending is thriving may well serve as a 
roadmap of shortcomings in the way banks have approached 
lending.13  Moreover, other financial intermediaries are finding 
innovative and potentially productive ways to harness technology in 
their underwriting procedures, and these efforts may well transform 
the standards used to assess the creditworthiness of would-be 
borrowers and expand the pool of eligible borrowers able to access 
capital on terms they can afford.14  Nonetheless, these technologies 
generally require resources to develop and thus tend to support the 
use of intermediaries who can afford such investments. 
Recognizng the market and regulatory forces favoring 
intermediated finance does not, however, answer the question of 
whether true direct finance has a future.  In the same speculative 
spirit that animates the rest of the analysis here, the paper 
identifies and seeks to learn from niches where it appears to have 
more potential.  The focus here is on the success of the platform 
Kickstarter, which connects artists and entrepreneurs with persons 
who provide financing in exchange for non-financial rewards and a 
nascent “locavesting” movement.  While these two niches look quite 
different from each other, and the various types of exchanges 
facilitated by Kickstarter often bear little resemblance to each other, 
they all share in common that the exchange involves something 
more than the provision of capital.5  Those seeking funding may get 
publicity, information about the demand for a project they are 
considering, or the ability to connect with potential customers; those 
providing the capital enjoy benefits like tangible goods that cannot 
be acquired elsewhere or the intrinsic satisfaction that comes from 
helping an artist create a public good.  These nonfinancial 
dimensions seem to be significant because they provide a new 
reason for the involvement of individuals.  While financial 
intermediaries may have a superior capacity to assess the expected 
financial return on a particular loan or to aggregate a diversified 
investment portfolio, only individuals know the subjective value 
they place on a particular product, and those values may vary 
significantly from one individual to another.  Similarly, a capital-
raising process that entails having a thousand (or a million) 
individual potential investors watch a video clip about a project can 
generate significant publicity, enhancing the probability of success 
in a way not easily replicated when the appeal is made solely to a 
handful of institutional investors.  These are just a couple of the 
many ways that direct transactions that bundle capital raising with 
 
 13. See infra Subpart II.B. 
 14. See infra Subpart II.A. 
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other undertakings might create value in ways that depend on the 
direct nature of the exchange. 
The notion that technological and other innovations may enable 
new types of bundling, and that such bundling will at times be 
optimal, has implications for both theory and policy.   Conventional 
wisdom has generally assumed that that technological and other 
innovations will result in capital raising being increasing unbundled 
from other commitments, and a number of historical developments 
support this wisdom.16  The analysis here suggests that there may 
be a second, simultaneous trend in the opposite direction.  For 
certain firms, bundling capital raising with other undertakings in 
ways historically not possible may prove to be optimal.17  If the rise 
of direct finance does indeed lead to greater bundling, this raises 
some interesting policy challenges.  In the United States and many 
other jurisdictions, the agencies and experts that oversee the capital 
markets overlap little with those who specialize in consumer 
protection, and there may well be benefits of crowdfunding that are 
not readily cognizable within any of the established 
frames.  Without purporting to offer any solutions, this article 
concludes by identifying some of the challenges that lie ahead if 
these predictions about where direct finance has the greatest 
potential to flourish prove accurate. 
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the 
evolution of P2P lending—the promise it embodied and the ways 
reality has fallen short.  Part II considers the reasons for this 
evolution and what has been lost and gained in the process.  Part III 
addresses alternative domains where direct finance appears poised 
to remain viable, focusing on Kickstarter and “locavesting.”  Part IV 
explores the theoretical and policy implications of these 
developments. 
I. The Evolution of P2P 
A. The Promise 
In an increasing number of domains, technology and changing 
consumer preferences have resulted in the rise of new, and often 
shorter, intermediation chains.18  For example, eBay now serves 
 
 16.  See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 17. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 18.  Any person or entity that provides value by reducing a barrier to 
transacting is, at least in part, functioning as an intermediary.  See, e.g., Carl J. 
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979); Robert 
C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism”, 99 YALE L.J. 611, 
615 (1989).  As reflected in the account of eBay, even many “direct” transactions 
entail the use of one or more intermediaries; and, as reflected in the evolution of 
P2P lending, the line between direct and intermediated transactions is far from 
clear-cut.  Nonetheless, this Article classifies transactions as direct when the 
intermediary facilitates the transaction but does not stand between the persons 
on both sides. 
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functions once fulfilled almost exclusively by secondhand shops—
enabling persons to sell used but still useful goods and allowing 
collectors and others to acquire products that are not available or 
are more expensive in the market for new products.  Rather than 
just serving as a substitute for an established set of intermediaries, 
however, eBay also enables thousands (if not millions) of 
transactions that would never have been possible under the 
traditional, more heavily intermediated mode of exchange.  By 
providing a platform that is easy for both sellers and buyers to 
navigate, charging relatively low fees, and attracting large numbers 
of both buyers and sellers, the site actually expands the pool of 
would-be sellers and would-be buyers.  Someone who would have 
allowed knick-knacks to accumulate dust in an attic rather than 
accept the low price that a secondhand shop would offer for the 
goods might today find it worthwhile to sell them directly on 
eBay.  The volume of transactions conducted on eBay suggests that 
the relatively modest effort required to sell goods, combined with the 
ability to sell them at prices close to their best-use values, makes 
selling goods on eBay a worthwhile undertaking for 
many.19  Similarly, and relatedly, the ability to locate a large 
number of goods that meet specified criteria with relatively little 
effort appears to enable eBay to attract buyers who would not 
otherwise peruse secondhand shops.  eBay thus exemplifies the 
ways that technology has evolved beyond enabling teams of 
specialized intermediaries to move goods between disparate buyers 
and sellers toward enabling a new mode of intermediation, in which 
a platform operates primarily to connect buyers and sellers so that 
they can enter into an exchange directly with one another. 
The rise of P2P lending in the mid-2000s seemed to fit neatly 
within this mold.  A 2007 news article about this then-emerging 
sector explained: “Prosper, based in San Francisco, aspires to do for 
money what eBay did for your grandmother’s teapot collection—
create a person-to-person marketplace for consumer loans, and in 
the process, turn average people into bankers.”20  As the co-founder 
of Prosper, at that time the leader in P2P lending, explained that 
same year: 
  When you go to Prosper, you are afforded the 
opportunity to tell a large picture, to talk about why 
you want the money, to tell your story, to invite your 
friends to give you endorsements, which is different 
from asking a friend to guarantee a loan . . . .  You 
 
 19.  E.g., eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 50 (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508815000054/ebay201
410-k.htm (showing that the net revenue for the company’s marketplace 
division was nearly $7 billion for 2014). 
 20.  Annys Shin, Want to Loan Me Money? Here's a Picture of My Dog, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at D1. 
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have an opportunity to tell a more complete picture, 
which leads to a better loan for everyone.21 
Inherent in this description is an assumption that giving would-be 
borrowers the opportunity to tell their stories in their own terms—
and giving would-be lenders the opportunity to read such stories and 
assess competing requests—would fundamentally transform the 
factors driving the process of determining who should receive credit 
and on what terms. 
The founder of Lending Club, which soon overtook Prosper as 
the leading P2P platform in the United States, expressed similar 
sentiments.  He proclaimed, “The idea is to simplify the process and 
operate a Web site where people who have money can lend directly 
to people who need the money.”22  Popular press accounts of P2P 
lending similarly highlighted its capacity to directly connect 
individuals seeking funds with others looking to invest, and how 
that might transform the process for both parties involved.  A 2009 
article, for example, opened by telling the stories of “Colin Nash, 35, 
[who] was struggling with $12,000 in credit card debt,” and “Michael 
Fisher, 24, [who] was looking for a new investment.”23  The article 
explained that while “[t]he two men . . . had never met,” each had 
his needs fulfilled when “Fisher loaned Nash $200” through 
Prosper.com.24  As the story explained, while serving the economic 
needs of lenders and borrowers, “Prosper’s . . . appeal . . . goes 
beyond the bottom line” thanks to the “[p]hotos and personal 
narratives [that] accompany borrowers’ requests.”25 
Popular accounts and early research on the potential of P2P 
lending often also echoed the claims made by Prosper’s founder 
regarding the capacity for P2P lending to provide credit to those who 
could not qualify for a loan from more traditional lenders.  A 2009 
news story, for example, illustrated how P2P lending platforms 
worked by telling the story of Lara Sargent, a woman who “needed 
about $15,000 to meet payroll and other expenses . . . as she 
prepared to open a group foster home for boys.”26  Lara obtained the 
needed financing from Lending Club “after her lender, Bank of 
America, declined to extend her line of credit.”27 
 
 21.  Yip, supra note 4. 
 22.  Paul Donsky, Finding Credit: Social Lending Firms Broker Buddy 
Loans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 18, 2009, at D1, 2009 WLNR 995242; see also 
John Gapper, The Lenders of the Revolution Look Familiar, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 
2015, at 9 (explaining that “[t]he idea of these initiatives was to democratise 
finance, taking on banks by removing a layer of complexity, costs and risk from 
the system and replacing them with a set of Ebays for lending”). 
 23.  Banks Watching Latest Online Trend: Strangers Asking Strangers for 
Loans, TIMES TRENTON, Nov. 28, 2007, at A15, 2007 WLNR 24100300. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Donsky, supra note 22. 
 27.  Id. 
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Explaining how P2P lending might expand the pool of would-be 
borrowers able to access credit, the San Francisco Federal Reserve 
Bank began by recognizing that the use of “standardized 
underwriting procedures and risk profiling algorithms,” combined 
with other economies of scale, enabled financial intermediaries, like 
banks, to “dramatically increase[] the availability of 
credit.”28  Nonetheless, the primary beneficiaries have been 
“[b]orrowers with standard risk profiles.”29  P2P lending, by 
contrast, could enable credit to be allocated “on the basis of trust, 
albeit trust between people that have only met in 
cyberspace.”30  Another expert opined in 2008 that “P2P players 
aren’t cutting the banks out of consumer lending . . . .  They are 
creating a new market for lending that the banking community 
doesn’t play in efficiently.”31  Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in 
these depictions of P2P lending is the idea that the wisdom of 
crowds could, at least some of the time, do a better job than the 
standardized underwriting criteria used by most banks. 
Another defining feature of P2P, as originally conceived, is that 
the architecture of the exchange was consistent with the emphasis 
on the peer-to-peer nature of the exchange.  As Lending Club 
explained, “[f]rom the launch of our platform . . . until April 7, 
2008 . . . our platform allowed members to purchase assignments of 
unsecured member loans directly.”32  During this period, for each 
loan that was made, the loan would be divided “into separate 
promissory notes in amounts that matched the purchase 
commitments from members for the particular member loan.  At 
 
 28.  Ian J. Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community Development 
Finance 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2009-06), 
http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/wp2009-06.pdf. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 2. 
 31.  David Migoya, Help from Friends: Peer-to-Peer Lending Websites Fill 
the Gap Left by Banks, DENVER POST, Nov. 16, 2008, at K1; see also Alan B. 
Krueger, In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for Cash, N.Y. TIMES: 
ECONOMIX (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:17 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-credit-crisis-some-turn-to-
online-peers-for-cash/?_r=0 (“P2P lending is a way to link lenders to borrowers 
without intermediation by a bank, much the way that eBay matches buyers and 
sellers of goods without a store in between.”); Amy B. Simpkins, Growing the 
Pie: Nontraditional Lenders Aim to Increase Opportunities for Small Businesses, 
BRIDGES, Fall 2010, at 6, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/br/2
010/br_fall_10.pdf (“Nontraditional service providers are attempting to respond 
to what they see as increasing market demand that is not being met by 
commercial banks and the traditional model of small business lending.”). 
 32. LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 55 (June 29, 2011), 
https://www.lendingclub.com/fileDownload.action?file=10-K-MAR-31-
2011.pdf&type=sf10k. 
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closing, WebBank indorsed the promissory notes to [Lending Club], 
and [Lending Club] assigned each promissory note to the applicable 
member.”33  This meant that P2P loans were structured to provide 
each lender a direct interest in each of the loans he or she had 
chosen to back. 
In highlighting the promise of P2P lending, it is critical to 
distinguish the expectations regarding how it might transform 
finance from the first generation of financial 
disintermediation.  Long before the recent trend toward direct 
interactions, financial and technological innovations dramatically 
altered the ways in which credit was created and 
disseminated.  Securitization, whereby loans typically are packaged 
with others loans into a securitization vehicle against which one or 
more classes of securities are issued, helped give rise to a shadow 
banking system.34  Banks typically still originated the loans, but the 
banks often sold those loans to securitization vehicles, and the 
securities issued were used as collateral in a range of transaction 
structures that collectively enabled maturity transformation, the 
provision of liquidity, and other functions traditionally performed by 
banks to be performed instead through the capital 
markets.35  Because banks are the prototypical financial 
intermediary, the rise of a market-based system that replicated 
many of the economic functions traditionally performed by banks 
was seen as a move toward disintermediation. 
This first-generation disintermediation was enabled and 
accelerated by technological and other innovations.  Yet the spirit of 
this first generation of disintermediation was quite different than 
that animating the rise of platforms like eBay, Airbnb, and those 
facilitating P2P lending.  Through a wide variety of mechanisms, 
the shadow banking system created by the first generation of 
financial disintermediation was deeply interconnected with the 
regulated banking sector; there was significant overlap in the key 
players in both worlds; and, while purporting to help consumers 
obtain credit on better terms, it was never meant to empower 
 
 33.  LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement under Securities Act of 
1933 (Form S-1) 79 (Oct. 7, 2011),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000119312511266917/d237605
ds1.htm#rom237605_22.  WebBank is an Utah-chartered industrial bank that 
works with both Prosper and Lending Club.  See Andrew Verstein, The 
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 476 
(2011). 
 34.  ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013); 
ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING: STAFF 
REPORT NO. 458, at 1 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf; Kathryn Judge, 
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and 
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 659–60 (2012). 
 35.  E.g., POZSAR ET AL., supra note 34. 
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individuals or create more direct relationships between the 
suppliers and recipients of capital.36  Rather, it typically led to much 
longer and more complex intermediation chains that made the 
relationship between the providers and suppliers of capital more 
attenuated than the relationship that arises when a bank operates 
in its traditional capacity.37 
P2P lending, by contrast, initially promised a radically different 
“second generation” of disintermediation.  It was promoted by 
Silicon Valley visionaries seeking to disrupt the prevailing regime 
rather than players within that regime who sought to increase 
profits by minimizing their regulatory burdens.  As reflected in the 
description above, P2P lending promised to be more like Etsy and 
the farmers’ market. 
B. Evolution 
Since its inception less than a decade ago, P2P lending has 
grown dramatically.  In 2012, the total market reached just over $1 
billion.38  By the end of 2014, Lending Club alone had originated $6 
billion in loans through its platform, and Prosper had originated 
more than $2 billion.39  P2P is also growing in other countries.  In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the volume of P2P loans doubled 
in 2014 to more than £1.2 billion, and some suggest it is likely to do 
the same in 2015.40  In conjunction with this growth, however, the 
very notion of what constitutes P2P lending has evolved so 
dramatically that serious questions are being raised about whether 
the term “person-to-person” even remains an apt moniker for the 
type of transaction these platforms are facilitating. 
1. Suppliers of Capital 
One of the most striking changes in P2P lending has been a 
rapid increase in the proportion of capital provided by institutions 
rather than individuals.  As noted in a recent Wall Street Journal 
article, one reason that the term “‘peer-to-peer’ lending” is “rapidly 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37. Judge, supra note 34, at 660. 
 38.  Chris Barth, Lend Thy Neighbor, FORBES, June 6, 2012, at 172. 
 39.  J.D. Alois, Prosper:  $493 Million in Peer to Peer Loans for Q3 2014, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2014, 7:06 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/11/56564-prosper-493-million-in-peer-
to-peer-loans-for-q3-2014/; Theron Mohamed, Peer-to-Peer Lending: The Next 
Gold Rush?, INV. CHRONICLE (Jan. 2, 2015), 
http://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/2015/01/02/comment/chronic-investor-
blog/peer-to-peer-lending-the-next-gold-rush-
QE0RtVNsYyOPFZfJo8ud4I/article.html. 
 40.  Ed Ballard, P2P Lending Gets a Fresh Boost from the Mainstream, 
WALL STREET J.: MONEYBEAT (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:34 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/01/30/p2p-lending-gets-a-fresh-boost-from-
the-mainstream/; see also Sebastian C. Moenninghoff & Axel Wieandt, The 
Future of Peer-to-Peer Finance, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE 
FORSCHUNG, Aug./Sept. 2013, at 466, 474. 
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heading into obsolescence . . . is that Prosper, like its peers, sells 
roughly two-thirds of its loans to institutions.”41  According to 
another source, a full 80% of the loans originated by Lending Club 
or Prosper are funded by institutional investors.42  Describing the 
evolution, one commentator recently observed that, while P2P 
lending started out as “a place for small investors to loan to other 
individuals, the field is now dominated by institutions, including 
hedge funds.”43  As a result, the term “marketplace lending” is now 
frequently being employed in lieu of P2P lending, as the term more 
accurately describes the nature of the transactions these sites 
typically facilitate.44 
Large, sophisticated institutional investors who are deploying 
capital that ultimately belongs to others look very different than 24-
year-old Michael Fisher, but institutionalization affects more than 
just aesthetics.  Perhaps the most striking difference between 
institutional and individual investors is the tools they bring to bear 
in assessing would-be borrowers.  While Michael Fisher may have 
been willing to, and may even have enjoyed, spending hours in front 
of his computer reading the life stories of potential borrowers and 
deploying money based on his instincts about how much he trusted a 
particular borrower,45 institutional investors are unlikely to do the 
same.  Instead, they are deploying financial and technological 
resources that, over time, might well enable them to screen 
borrowers more effectively than the underlying platforms, leaving 
many concerned that they will leave only lemons in their wake.46 
The major P2P companies have recognized the potential for this 
influx of new capital to transform their business model.  In 2013, for 
example, Lending Club asked a sovereign wealth fund seeking to 
lend $250 million via its platform to spread that amount over two 
years to minimize the distortions that might result.47  Nonetheless, 
these scruples seem to have dissipated rather quickly, and it is not 
clear that Prosper and Lending Club could maintain their 
competitive edge in the field if they impose such limits. 
 
 41.  Telis Demos, P2P Lender Prosper Buying Medical Loan Provider, WALL 
STREET J.: MONEYBEAT (Jan. 27, 2015, 2:15 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/01/27/p2p-lender-prosper-buying-medical-
loan-provider/. 
 42.  Jonathan Ford, Wall Street’s Siren Song Lures P2P Lenders into 
Treacherous Seas, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2014, at 16. 
 43.  Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Telis Demos, For Peer Lending, a Change in 
Financing, WALL STREET J., Oct. 21, 2014, at C3. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See supra Subpart I.A. 
 46.  Cf. Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding:  The Real and the Illusory 
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 285 (2014). 
 47.  Lending Club: Peer Review, ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG (Jan. 5, 
2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/01/lending-
club. 
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Looking beyond the source of the capital flowing into the two 
leading lending platforms reveals further indicia that these types of 
changes are underway and will affect other dimensions of the P2P 
lending process.  For example, leading members of the banking 
industry are backing a start-up that links institutional investors 
with P2P loan opportunities.48  Such additional intermediaries may 
prove efficient, but they will necessarily use routinized mechanisms 
for identifying creditworthy borrowers and will further attenuate 
the relationship between the provider and recipient of capital, 
reflecting the way that the changing lender base inevitably will also 
transform who receives loans, how they are selected, and the 
ultimate intermediation chain that results.  These tendencies are 
accentuated by two other developments, discussed further below—
that some loans which originated on P2P platforms are now being 
packaged into securitization structures and that individual 
investors increasingly rely on automated tools to select which loans 
to fund.49 
Another way that established financial intermediaries are 
transforming the lender base and traditional P2P lending is by 
setting up their own lending platforms.  The most prominent 
example is the announcement from Goldman Sachs that it intends 
to create its own “marketplace lending” platform, in which it will use 
its already advanced risk-assessment technologies to assess who will 
receive a loan, and it will itself provide the capital to fund 
it.50  While the actual ramifications of this development are not yet 
known, commentators have already identified it as yet another sign 
that the “peer” in peer-to-peer is likely a thing of the past.51 
2. Recipients of Capital and Screening Process 
In conjunction with the fluctuating lender base, there have been 
notable changes in the borrower base and the mechanisms for 
determining which would-be borrowers actually receive 
funding.  These shifts are reflected in changes in Prosper’s business 
model.  When it first launched in 2006, 25% of those seeking funds 
through Prosper were subprime borrowers—a figure that fell to just 
5% by 2008.52  This was in part because Prosper’s original business 
model allowed most people seeking credit to post a loan request, and 
the role of determining whether to extend credit to a particular 
borrower and on what terms was given to the original would-be 
lenders reviewing the requests.53 
 
 48.  Dugan & Demos, supra note 43. 
 49.  See infra Subpart I.B.3. 
 50. E.g., Gapper, supra note 22. 
 51. Id. 
 52.  Richard Burnett, Need a Loan? Web May Come to Rescue, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, July 14, 2008, at A1. 
 53.  Verst ein, supra note 33, at 453. 
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As originally designed, Prosper was thus meant to function in a 
manner akin to Airbnb—as a relatively passive intermediary that 
provides a technologically sophisticated platform through which 
those supplying a good connect with those who want it.  For Airbnb, 
the good is a place to stay, while in P2P lending, the good is capital; 
but the overall design was meant to be similar.  Airbnb does not 
engage in any ex ante screening with respect to those posting places 
to rent or would-be renters.  Anyone can post a listing and anyone 
can make an offer to stay in a place so listed.  The obligation to 
distinguish the good from the bad and to assess the value 
proposition of any particular good lies primarily in the hands of the 
individual users.  Airbnb facilitates this process in a number of 
ways, but it is the parties to the transaction that ultimately must 
decide whether they have received sufficient assurances that they 
are willing to enter into an exchange with the party on the other 
side. 
While Prosper’s original business model was quite similar, 
Prosper soon changed its approach.  It turned out that while 
individual lenders had some ability to screen would-be borrowers, 
they were not particularly good at this task.54  As a result, lenders 
on Prosper faced a relatively high default rate—16.5% on loans that 
originated between November 2005 and October 2008.55 
The process for determining who gets funded has since evolved 
in a number of ways.  Many of the changes have come from the 
changing makeup and behavior of the lender base.  An early study 
revealed that while borrowers with poor credit histories constituted 
the bulk of would-be borrowers in Prosper’s early days, even during 
that period, such borrowers were substantially less likely to receive 
a loan than borrowers with stronger credit histories.56  Another 
early study found that the parties providing loans altered their 
lending behavior over time—increasing their reliance on “hard” data 
and reducing their willingness to have funding decisions swayed by 
the full story beyond that data.57  As a result, Prosper made 
corresponding changes in its business model—in response to the 
greater demand for hard data, Prosper began to supply more of it.58 
 
 54.  Michael S. Maier, Lending to Strangers: Does Verification Matter? 19–
20 (Jan. 15, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379593 (prepared for the 2014 
Canadian Academic Accounting Association Annual Conference). 
 55.  Paul Katzeff, Pros, Cons of Peer-to-Peer Lending, INV. BUS. DAILY (June 
12, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://news.investors.com/investing-mutual-funds/061209-
479444-pros-cons-of-peer-to-peer-lending.htm. 
 56.  Gao Ruiqiong & Feng Junwen, An Overview Study on P2P Lending, 8 
INT’L BUS. & MGMT. 14, 15–16 (2014). 
 57.  Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, Do Social Networks Solve 
Information Problems for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.com 25 
(NET Institute, Working Paper No. 08-43, 2008). 
 58.  Id. 
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In addition to learning that their instincts about who might be a 
credit risk were less reliable than hard data indicative of such, the 
composition of would-be lenders and their processes for choosing 
which loans to fund also had profound effects on the screening 
process.  Institutional investors and any new intermediaries that 
they employ bring data and resources to the process of trying to 
determine which would-be borrowers to fund.  The rise of a new firm 
created with the sole aim of helping such investors with this process 
suggests that lenders will play a very active role in determining who 
gets funded, but they will likely be using proprietary algorithms and 
other mechanisms that necessarily reduce each request to a 
standardized set of measures.59 
The processes through which the remaining individual lenders 
choose would-be borrowers have also evolved dramatically, and in 
ways that further whittle back the number of people doing any type 
of individualized analysis of the requests.  The most significant 
change here has been the introduction of new features on Prosper 
and Lending Club that allow individual lenders to invest using an 
automated feature that allows would-be lenders to identify the types 
of loans in which they want to invest—effectively choosing how 
much capital they want to allocate among the different risk 
categories and then leaving the rest to the platform.60  In order to 
encourage investors to use this automated feature, Lending Club 
touts that “[w]ith just $2,500 you can spread your investment across 
100 Notes” and “99.9% of investors that own 100+ Notes of relatively 
equal size have seen positive returns.”61  It further highlights that 
this feature provides lenders with “[a]ccess to the latest listed 
loans,” while saving them time and requiring less effort to put their 
capital to work.62  This approach is rational for most individual 
investors, but by its nature it strips the process of determining 
which borrowers get funded from any individualized review by 
individual lenders. 
When loans are funded in this way, the only screening process 
used by the platform is to determine which would-be borrowers 
actually get to post their requests.  This is the second way that the 
process has evolved dramatically over the short lifespan of P2P 
lending.  Both Prosper and Lending Club have become increasingly 
stringent in this regard.  Prosper has evolved from a passive 
platform that allows any would-be borrower to make a request and 
have that request reviewed by would-be lenders to an active filter 
 
 59.  See infra Subpart II.B. 
 60.  LENDINGCLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 
2015); PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 61.  Understanding the Basics, LENDINGCLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/build-portfolio.action (last visited Sept. 11, 
2015). 
 62.  Id. 
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that allows only a limited portion of the requests to ever be seen by 
would-be lenders .  Moreover, the metrics it uses to do so strongly 
resemble those long used by banks and traditional financial 
intermediaries.63 
Lending Club always played an active screening role, but it too 
has become more stringent in its requirements over time.  These 
changes reduce the number of would-be borrowers who have the 
opportunity to tell their whole story, as originally envisioned.64  It 
also uses traditional metrics of creditworthiness in making these 
determinations.  For example, the primary metric that Lending Club 
considers is a would-be borrower’s FICO score.65  Depending on that 
score, the platform also considers the borrower’s debt-to-income 
ratio; the number of credit accounts currently open; the current 
balance on revolving accounts; whether the borrower has current or 
recent delinquencies or other problems on his credit report; and the 
length of the person’s credit history.66 
As one would expect, as the platforms have altered the lending 
process in ways that make it increasingly resemble the process used 
by banks, the borrower base has evolved to consist primarily of 
persons who could obtain credit, albeit at a potentially higher price, 
from banks.  As Lending Club touted to investors, at year-end 2014, 
the average Lending Club borrower has a personal income of 
$73,278, which the site suggests is the “top 10% of US population”; a 
FICO score of 700 (which is a little below the national median of 
723); and a lengthy 15.9 years of credit history.67  More generally, 
the notion that P2P platforms will enable borrowers to be evaluated 
on nontraditional metrics and service segments of the population 
unable to access credit elsewhere has largely disappeared. 
3.  Relationship between Supplier and Recipient 
A number of the changes already described have altered the 
relationship between the suppliers and recipients of capital away 
from the direct connection originally promised.  In particular, the 
institutional investors that now dominate the lending base are 
typically investing capital for the benefit of others, thus creating at 
least one additional node separating the ultimate suppliers and 
recipients of capital. 
 
 63.  See Freedman & Jin, supra note 57, at 33. 
 64.  See LendingClub Corp., supra note 33, at 80–81. 
 65.  Id.  FICO scores are used by various lenders to evaluate the credit risk 
of consumers.  FICO Score, FICO, http://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-score 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 66.  How It Works, LENDINGCLUB , https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-
peer-lending-works.action (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 67. Earn Solid Returns, LENDINGCLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/steady-returns.action (last visited Sept. 11, 
2015); Lori Lamb, What Is a Good Credit Score?, CREDIT.ORG (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://credit.org/blog/what-is-a-good-credit-score-infographic/. 
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At the same time, a massive change in the regulatory treatment 
of P2P loans has brought about an even more radical change in P2P 
loans, one that adds yet another node between the supplier and 
recipient of capital.  In 2008, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) deemed the notes embodying P2P loans to be 
securities that needed to be registered under the Securities Act.68  In 
order to comply with SEC regulations, Lending Club and eventually 
Prosper agreed to register the notes as securities.69  Lending Club 
provided the following simplified depiction of the new relationship 
between the individual lenders and in the securities filings that 
accompanied those offerings70: 
[Flow Chart] 
As this image reflects, today’s lenders have no direct 
relationship with the borrower receiving the funds 
provided.  Rather, they have a claim only against the lending 
platform.  Moreover, while the value of that claim depends on the 
performance of the reference loan, it is not secured by it.  Thus, 
when looking at the structure of the relationship—as opposed to the 
expected return on the investment—it begins to look a lot more like 
a traditional bank. 
Another recent development that further transforms 
intermediation chains created through P2P platforms is that such 
loans are starting to be securitized.71  The trend started with 
unrated securitization transactions but recently has expanded into 
rated transactions.  The P2P platform Social Finance, which 
specializes in P2P student loans, has consummated two 
securitization transactions rated by Standard & Poor’s,72 and in 
February 2015, Blackrock sponsored a securitization transaction 
backed by unsecured loans from Prosper that was rated by 
Moody’s.73  The ability to obtain ratings further increases the types 
of institutional investors that can invest in P2P-originated 
loans.74  It is also likely to further accelerate the trend toward 
 
 68.  Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 
4978684 (Sec. Exch. Comm’n Nov. 24, 2008). 
 69.  Prosper originally challenged the designation, but ultimately lost, 
forcing it to follow Lending Club.  See id. 
 70.  LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form S-1) 6 (June 20, 2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000089161808000318/f41480or
sv1.htm. 
 71.  Joy Wiltermuth & Andrew Park, BlackRock Sets New P2P Consumer 
Loan Benchmark, INT’L FIN. REV. (Feb. 5, 2015), 2015 WLNR 3627152. 
 72.  SoFi Completes $303 MM ‘A’ Rated Securitization of Refinanced 
Student Loans, YAHOO! FINANCE (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:30 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/sofi-completes-303-mm-rated-173039163.html. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Tracy Alloway, Bankers Work on Rated P2P Securitisations, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2014, at 20. 
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reliance on standardized metrics in determining which borrowers 
get funded, as standardization is key to making securitization work 
and to enabling rating agencies to make the estimations of default 
required to rate a security. 
Connecting these developments to the changing lender base 
reveals just how far P2P has strayed from the original vision.  In the 
majority of situations, there are now at least two permanent 
nodes—the P2P platform or securitization vehicle and the 
institutional investor—separating the individuals on both sides of 
the chain.  Additionally, both of these nodes pool capital from 
multiple sources and invest it in multiple projects.  While enabling 
diversification and other benefits, this also further attenuates the 
relationship between the individuals supplying the capital and the 
individuals and small businesses receiving it.75 
4.Looking Ahead 
The changes in P2P lending in recent years have been rapid and 
dramatic.  Given the dynamism of the industry thus far, it may well 
continue to evolve, potentially in unexpected ways.  Nonetheless, 
other indications suggest it is unlikely to return to the initial vision 
as a forum for direct finance, free from the influence of banks and 
other established financial intermediaries.  Even beyond the 
changes described above, other dimensions of the P2P industry 
today further undermine its potential as a radical alternative to 
Wall Street and the established banking regime.  For example, John 
Mack, the former head of Morgan Stanley, now serves on Lending 
Club’s board of directors.76  Similarly, an increasing number of 
banks are entering into partnerships with P2P platforms pursuant 
to which the banks will sometimes refer customers to the platform 
and other times acquire whole loans originated through the 
platform.77  And many anticipate that the entry of Goldman Sachs 
both will further transform what had been P2P and is also 
indicative of the way P2P lending is evolving into something that 
resembles the first generation of disintermediation and that will 
evolve to become part of the shadow banking system.78  Thus, while 
it is hard to know what the future will look like, P2P lending seems 
 
 75.  See Judge, supra note 34, at 659. 
 76.  LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form S-1) 101 (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000119312514323136/d766811
ds1.htm. 
 77.  Community Banks Face Risks, Opportunities in P2P Alliance, FITCH 
RATINGS (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Community-
Banks-Face?pr_id=979915; Matt Scully, Banks Heat Up Bidding for Peer-to-
Peer Loans, ORIGINATION NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/banks-heat-up-
bidding-for-peer-to-peer-loans-1042818-1.html. 
 78. E.g., Gapper, supra note 22. 
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deeply entangled in long intermediation chains and increasingly 
interconnected with the established regime.  This period may very 
well mark the death knell of the original promise of P2P lending and 
the term itself may soon fade along with that promise. 
II. Assessing the Evolution 
Today, P2P lending bears little resemblance to the vision touted 
less than a decade ago.  Not surprisingly, many have been dismayed 
by this failure to live up to its original potential.  As one 
commentator recently noted, “some see the institutional and bank 
interest . . . as a cynical takeover by Big Bizness of a grass-roots 
social movement that grew out of the rubble of the global financial 
crisis and deep mistrust of the banks.”79  Yet the magnitude of these 
changes, coupled with the dramatic growth of the industry, may 
suggest that the value created by P2P arises from sources other 
than those originally envisioned.  This Part identifies some early-
stage lessons—that may yet be proven wrong—based on the 
evolution thus far.  In light of the preliminary stage of this analysis 
and the challenge of reaching any normative conclusions without 
examining the broader landscape in which these changes are 
occurring, the account is largely positive. 
I suggest that the demise of the promise initially embodied in 
P2P may indicate that the benefits that arise from direct 
transactions in other domains are not present in the same way in 
finance.  Etsy and eBay succeed by connecting disparate buyers and 
sellers who are exchanging idiosyncratic goods on which different 
people place radically different subjective values.  As explained by 
Chris Anderson, these sites are part of a larger phenomenon 
whereby the Internet is facilitating the rise of “new niche 
market[s].”80  However, the same is not true for capital.  Unlike a 
secondhand clock or a handmade tea towel, capital is fungible.  The 
parties at each end of the spectrum rarely have any idiosyncratic 
preferences—each wants to provide or receive capital on 
competitive, risk-adjusted terms.  This Part considers the ways that 
the fungibility of capital may limit the transformative potential of 
direct transactions when the exchange is a pure investment.  Yet, as 
the final Part addresses, direct finance may yet be viable, and could 
even thrive, when the exchange has noninvestment dimensions, for 
it is along these other dimensions that the presence of individuals is 
most likely to have tangible benefits that cannot be easily replicated 
at a lower cost by an intermediary.81 
A. The Wisdom of Crowds v. the Resources of Experts 
 
 79.  Keith Mullin, Peer-to-Peer Lending Takes Off . . . P2PABS Anyone?, 
IFR ASIA (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.ifrasia.com/peer-to-peer-lending-takes-off-
p2pabs-anyone?/21188145.article. 
 80.  CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS 
SELLING LESS OF MORE 6 (2008). 
 81.  See infra Part IV. 
DIRECT FINANCE 9.18.15.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/15  3:51 PM 
120 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX 
There continues to be a lot of hype surrounding the potential for 
crowdfunding to fundamentally transform debt and equity 
markets.82  It is far too early to conclude that such hype is 
unwarranted, but the transformation of the P2P market in recent 
years casts doubt on whether crowdfunding is likely to be as 
transformative as some suggest.  In particular, one purported 
benefit of crowdfunding, which was reflected in early depictions of 
P2P, is that bringing the wisdom of crowds to the table might enable 
the identification of meritorious undertakings that would otherwise 
go unfunded.83  P2P, for example, was never intended to replace 
banks, but it was heralded as likely to overcome shortcomings in the 
standardized approaches banks employ for most small-scale lending 
decisions.  The assumption was that those approaches, precisely 
because of their impersonal and routinized nature, had to overlook 
some creditworthy borrowers, and the wisdom of crowds could 
identify creditworthy borrowers that did not fit the traditional 
mold.  The subsequent evolution of P2P lending suggests otherwise: 
the loans underperformed when individuals used their subjective 
judgments of who seemed creditworthy.84  Lenders and platforms 
quickly responded in ways that increased the performance of the 
loans extended but undermined the degree to which the wisdom of 
crowds played any role in the screening process.85 
This does not undermine the possibility that technology and 
data might succeed in identifying borrowers who are more 
creditworthy than their credit scores and other traditional metrics 
suggest.  For example, there are a number of start-ups that are 
experimenting with using new tools to assess whether a borrower is 
likely to be a good credit risk.  Rather than relying heavily on credit 
scores, these start-ups are exploring ways that new information and 
technology may be used to develop quite different metrics for 
assessing a borrower’s propensity to repay.86  One such lender uses a 
“software-based lending platform” which enables it to consider 
“thousands of data points” and helps “to reduce the risk of fraud as 
 
 82.  Ben Sisario, Pop Acts Go to Highest-Bidding City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2012, at C4; Nevin Martell, How to Buy a Little Slice of a Bakery, and Get More 
Than Crumbs If It’s a Hit, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/how-to-buy-a-little-slice-of-a-
bakery-and-get-more-than-crumbs-if-its-a-hit/2015/05/13/7eab6f58-f811-11e4-
a13c-193b1241d51a_story.html. 
 83.  Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the 
Economy, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-
how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/. 
 84. Elaine Moore & Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending: The Wisdom of 
Crowds, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at 9. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Steve Lohr, Creditworthy? Let’s Consider Capitalization, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2015, at A1. 
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well as borrower defaults.”87  The application process is also tailored 
to the applicant.  A borrower who wants money for a security 
deposit, for example, is asked about when they are moving, where 
they are moving to, and whether they are changing jobs in the 
process.88  These lenders incorporate factors not previously 
considered—like whether an applicant uses proper capitalization in 
filling out a form—and alter the weight accorded to other factors 
that have long played a role in assessing a borrower’s propensity to 
repay a loan, such as missed payments in the past.89   Longer term, 
big data may end up devising more accurate criteria for assessing a 
person’s propensity to repay a loan and may transform underwriting 
in the process.  As the screening process improves, the costs of 
borrowing should go down and the pool of eligible borrowers may 
well expand.  Nonetheless, it is resource-intensive research and 
development that is allowing for this innovation, not the wisdom of 
the masses. 
Viewing these developments from a different angle, the fact that 
P2P screening processes increasingly resemble banks’ underwriting 
processes may suggest that banks actually do a pretty good job in 
determining to whom to allocate credit.  New types of expertise may 
further refine and improve the process, but the wisdom of crowds 
does not appear poised to fill in meaningful gaps, much less displace 
established modes of intermediation.90  If anything, it is 
intermediaries investing the money of others who will most likely be 
able to justify the investments required to develop and refine this 
new technology. 
Another necessary coda is that bringing the wisdom of crowds to 
credit decisions could have some undesirable consequences.  At least 
one study found that that when would-be black borrowers included a 
picture with their loan request, they were less likely to have their 
loans funded than would-be white borrowers with similar credit 
ratings, and, conditional on receiving a loan, black borrowers were 
likely to pay a higher rate of interest.91  In addition to finding what 
the authors characterize as “significant racial discrimination,” the 
 
 87.  How It Works, EARNEST, https://www.meetearnest.com/how-it-works 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 88.  Personal Loans, EARNEST, https://www.meetearnest.com/personal-loans 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 89.  Lohr, supra note 86. 
 90.  The potential for the wisdom of crowds to outperform experts may be 
greater with respect to other types of crowdfunding.  See, e.g., Ethan R. Mollick 
& Venkat Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding 13 
(UNC Kenan-Flagler, Working Paper No. 2376997, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376997; Ethan R. Mollick, Swept Away by the Crowd? 
Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and the Selection of Entrepreneurs 2 (Mar. 25, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239204. 
 91.  Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of 
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53, 55–56 (2011). 
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study found that lending platforms also “discriminate[] somewhat 
against the elderly and significantly overweight, but in favor of 
women and those that signal military involvement.”92  In sum, while 
the evolution of P2P lending over the brief time examined herein is 
far too limited of a data set from which to draw any strong 
conclusions, it does suggest that there is reason to be skeptical that 
crowdfunding—as opposed to other innovative approaches to 
underwriting—is likely to be an effective mechanism for identifying 
creditworthy borrowers overlooked by banks. 
B. Banks—Good But Not Perfect 
Even if P2P lending today bears little resemblance to the vision 
initially promised, it has grown at a remarkable pace and seems 
poised to continue its ascent.  That rate of growth suggests that 
there is real value being created by P2P lending relative to other 
modes of intermediation.  If not from the wisdom of crowds, the 
question remains from where that value is coming.  At least part of 
the answer likely harkens back to the forces driving the first 
generation of disintermediation and suggests that there may be 
more similarities between P2P and securitization and its ilk than 
was evident initially, even apart from the recent merging of the two 
innovations. 
One inescapable answer regarding value creation is regulation, 
or rather the avoidance thereof.  The United States and other 
leading countries are in the midst of imposing a broad reform 
agenda designed to create a more resilient financial system.93  The 
2007–2009 financial crisis served as a reminder that weaknesses in 
the financial system can have significant and devastating 
consequences for the real economy.  Many of these reforms have 
targeted banks, particularly large ones.94  By increasing the amount 
of capital banks must hold and imposing a number of other new 
regulatory burdens on banks, the reforms may well strengthen the 
banking system.95  Nonetheless, by imposing new costs on banks, 
the reform agenda has the inevitable effect of increasing the value 
that can be created by moving activity out of the highly regulated 
banking sector.  Other ways that P2P lending seems to be creating 
value are by eschewing many of the operational expenses associated 
with running a bank and expanding the types of investors who can 
provide capital for personal and other loans.96 
The rapid growth of P2P lending may also suggest that it is 
meeting consumer demands that were not adequately addressed by 
 
 92.  Id. at 55. 
 93.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Moore & Alloway, supra note 84. 
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traditional banks.  One of the primary reasons that borrowers seek 
money from P2P platforms is to pay off credit card debt.97  The 
credit card market is competitive, and credit card companies 
regularly seek to attract new clientele—or expand the business they 
receive from current, creditworthy clients—by allowing clients to 
transfer balances from other credit cards and even to receive favored 
interest rates on those balances.98  Nonetheless, the terms banks 
offer to entice clients to transfer existing balances typically also 
include other features that can substantially increase the effective 
cost of their credit, particularly if a borrower is not sufficiently 
discerning.99  That such structures are so commonplace suggests 
that even though the credit card market may be highly competitive, 
competition has led to terms that are attractive along dimensions 
that are most likely to be salient to potential borrowers but has not 
necessarily resulted in lowering the cost of funds in the manner one 
might expect based on a simplified model of competition and credit 
creation.100 
Viewed in these terms, P2P loans may offer a different type of 
product to consumers, one for which there appears to be significant 
demand.  Paying off an outstanding credit card balance with a three-
year or five-year loan from a P2P platform avoids any such 
complications and typically enables the borrower to pay a rate of 
interest that is significantly lower than the interest rate she had 
been paying on that balance.101  Particularly for borrowers who have 
been burned, or know others previously affected, by failing to be 
sufficiently wary when using a balance transfer to pay off credit 
card debt, this may be quite attractive.  Lending Club seems to 
recognize that the structure may be part of what makes P2P loans 
attractive, as it advertises to would-be borrowers the fact that 
 
 97.  Ann Carrns, Online Lending Sites Offer Alternative to Traditional 
Borrowing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/business/online-lending-sites-offer-
alternative-to-traditional-borrowing.html. 
 98.  Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the 
Life-Cycle with Implications for Regulation 13 (Oct. 19,  2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790. 
 99.  Id. (describing one of the most common structures used to encourage 
borrowers to transfer balances, how borrowers can end up overpaying, and how 
long it takes different borrowers to figure out the optimal strategy). 
 100.  See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act 
and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 978–79 (2012). 
 101.  According to Lending Club, “[b]orrowers who used a personal loan via 
Lending Club to consolidate debt or pay off high interest credit cards report in a 
survey that the interest rate on their loan was an average of 7.0 percentage 
points lower than they were paying on their outstanding debt or credit 
cards.”  Pay Off Credit Cards, LENDINGCLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/credit-card-loans.action (last visited Sept. 
11, 2015). 
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lending clubs have “[f]ixed rates and payments with no hidden 
fees.”102 
Whether there are other gaps in the provision of credit by 
traditional banks that P2P might be able to fill remains to be 
seen.  There have been long-standing debates about whether banks 
do an adequate job of providing loans to small businesses, and many 
viewed this potential deficiency as another area where P2P lending 
might be primed to thrive.  The data available, while preliminary, 
cast doubt on this proposition.103  A recent study from economists at 
the Federal Reserve using data from Lending Club found that small 
business loans were less likely to get funded and more than twice as 
likely to perform poorly if funded than other types of loans.104  P2P 
lending appears to be gaining traction in providing loans for medical 
needs—a niche that seems to have been serviced, at least in part, 
outside the banking system even before the entry of P2P.105 
The aim here is not to provide an exhaustive account of where 
P2P lending is most likely to succeed but rather to note that the 
ways in which it has started to emulate traditional financial 
intermediaries may be a testament to the efficiency of their 
underwriting procedures.  While the particular niches in which P2P 
lending is growing most rapidly may serve as a roadmap to those 
sectors of the credit market that have not been as well served by 
banks and other established intermediaries, the data available 
support the notion that banks seem to do a pretty good job with 
screening and credit-allocation decisions. 
C. Intermediation Chains Not Easily Shortened 
Another implication of the rapid and dramatic changes in P2P 
lending is that long, complex intermediation chains seem unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon.  Nor do the established players, from banks 
to institutional investors, seem likely to be displaced.  While these 
firms were not the drivers of the second generation of 
disintermediation, they have quickly infiltrated and changed the 
course of the revolution it embodies in the process.  This is likely 
due in part to intermediary influence—that is, the tendency and 
capacity of entrenched intermediaries to distort the processes 
 
 102. Personal Loans, LENDINGCLUB, 
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/personal-loans.action (last visited Sept. 11, 
2015). 
 103. See TRACI L. MACH ET AL., PEER-TO-PEER LENDING TO SMALL BUSINESSES 
(Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2014-10, 
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201410/201410pap.pdf.  
 104. Id. at 5–7. 
 105. Demos, supra note 41; see also Mark Calvey, Lending Club Debuts 
Education and Patient Financing Services, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:42 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/11/lending-club-
consumer-finance-education-loans.html. 
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through which institutions evolve in self-serving ways.106  But there 
also appears to be a variety of less troubling forces operating to 
impede a shift to direct finance. 
One factor is that institutional investors enjoy genuine 
informational and resource advantages over retail investors.  As just 
discussed, it is not yet clear whether the wisdom of crowds can 
outmatch the advantages enabled by the scale and scope enjoyed by 
large institutional investors.107  Screening, monitoring, and 
diversification are just a few of the many important and otherwise 
costly services that intermediaries can provide. 
The regulatory regime and the policy concerns that animate it 
also tends to favor intermediation, as reflected in the ways the SEC 
effectively mandated that P2P lending platforms remain as a node 
separating those providing and receiving capital through P2P 
loans.  Some informed observers have critiqued the changes the SEC 
mandated with respect to P2P loans.  Professor Andrew Verstein, for 
example, has persuasively argued that the SEC’s approach to 
regulating P2P lending imposes an “ill-fitting framework” on the 
industry, and he has identified numerous shortcomings in its 
approach.108  The analysis here supports concerns that the SEC may 
be poorly suited to address many of the challenges posed by direct 
finance.109  Nonetheless, the investor protection concerns that 
underlie the SEC’s approach are legitimate and are not going to 
disappear anytime soon.110 
D. Looking Ahead 
A critical factor underlying the evolution of P2P is that both 
would-be lenders and borrowers are entering into the transaction for 
primarily financial reasons.  Borrowers want a lower interest rate or 
a different loan structure than they can readily obtain elsewhere; 
whether the money comes from an institutional investor or an 
individual matters less than its availability and terms.  Similarly, 
despite at times being depicted in more romantic terms, the short 
history suggests that most lenders provide capital for such loans 
because they expect an attractive rate of return on a risk-adjusted 
basis.  The positive account here suggests that when an exchange is 
only about capital, the many advantages enjoyed by established 
intermediaries will make them difficult to displace 
completely.  Capital is fungible.  Moreover, even when new modes of 
intermediation arise, the advantages that established players and 
modes of intermediation enjoy may well enable them to infiltrate the 
new domain. 
 
 106.  Kathryn  Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 
(2015). 
 107.   See Parsont, supra note 45, at 321–23; see also supra Subpart II.A. 
 108.  Verstein, supra note 32, at 488. 
 109.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 110.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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Yet it does not follow that the move to direct transactions 
observable in other settings is destined to bypass capital 
raising.  Stepping back from the focus on P2P lending to take in the 
broader landscape reveals that this movement is starting to 
infiltrate the process of raising capital in ways that may prove more 
enduring.  Examining the success of Kickstarter and the ascendant 
“locavesting” movement, this next Part suggests that direct 
transactions may yet thrive.  The key distinguishing factor is likely 
to be whether the exchange entails at least some nonfinancial 
dimensions. 
III. Looking Beyond P2P 
The analysis thus far has focused almost exclusively on P2P 
lending.  Its evolution may well have lessons for crowdfunding more 
generally, but there are limits to what can be inferred from one 
domain of this broader phenomenon.  The importance of looking 
beyond P2P to develop a more balanced assessment of the viability 
of crowdfunding is reflected in signs that the wisdom and 
participation of crowds may have value in some settings.  For 
example, a recent study on the outcomes of equity crowdfunded 
firms in Europe found that “the firms on average experience a peak 
in both sales and sales growth during the year after the campaign, 
and that this tends to be positively impacted by a larger number of 
investors through the campaign.”111  The study further found that 
“the campaign on average helped the firms to gain press attention 
and publicity.”112  In other words, equity crowdfunding may be 
beneficial for firms and may also provide benefits to retail investors 
in ways that go beyond the pure investment dynamics of the 
exchange.  Without purporting to provide a comprehensive account, 
this Part focuses on a few areas where crowdfunding appears to be 
gaining traction in order to consider the limits to the assessment 
here that true direct finance is unlikely to displace established 
financial intermediaries and long, complex intermediation chains 
anytime soon. 
A. Kickstarter 
Among the most successful crowdfunding platforms is 
Kickstarter.113  Billing itself as “a new way to fund creative 
projects,” Kickstarter enables filmmakers, musicians, artists, 
videogame designers, and other types of entrepreneurs to propose 
 
 111.  Maxence Décarre & Emelie Wetterhag, Uncovering the Outcomes of 
Equity Crowdfunding: Post-Funding Outcomes of Equity Crowdfunded Firms in 
Europe 6 (Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Stockholm School of 
Economics), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545276. 
112 Id. at 7. 
 113. E.g., Stephen Heyman, Keeping up with Kickstarter, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2015, at 11.  For an overview of Kickstarter and crowdfunding more 
generally, see Ethan R. Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An 
Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1 (2014).  
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“projects, big and small,” and it has helped entrepreneurs finance 
projects ranging from a theatrical production114 to a new line of yoga 
clothing.115  A typical proposal features some information about the 
entrepreneur and the proposed project, but also includes an array of 
other material—like pictures, videos, and stories—intended to 
capture the spirit of the proposal and otherwise engage with would-
be funders. 
There are many similarities between Kickstarter and the 
original paradigm for P2P lending.  The platforms in both settings 
facilitate connections between would-be suppliers of capital and 
those seeking capital.  In both settings, technology plays a critical 
role connecting persons who may be geographically and otherwise 
quite distant.  Platforms in both settings allow would-be funders to 
search for particular types of projects or would-be borrowers and to 
choose the size of the commitment that they are willing to 
make.  Similarly, funding of a Kickstarter project, just like the 
funding of a P2P loan, is contingent upon the project receiving 
commitments that satisfy the amount requested, and most 
commitments cover only a small portion of the amount requested, so 
it is only when there is broad support for a project or loan that it 
gets funded. 
Yet there are also notable differences between Kickstarter and 
P2P lending.  Most importantly, in contrast to P2P lending and 
many other forms of crowdfunding, the persons providing the capital 
to support a project do not get any economic rights in exchange for 
that capital, nor do they have any rights with respect to the 
project.  Rather, funders are typically provided a promise of an 
opportunity or good related to the project being funded along with 
any utility they may derive from feeling like they are part of the 
creative process or supporting the person or project they have 
committed to support.116  The opportunities and goods that funders 
of various levels will receive are established by the entrepreneur 
when he or she proposes a project and are often closely tethered to 
the proposed undertaking.  Other motivations, according to one 
serial funder, include “providing encouragement” and “trying to help 
someone bring their project to life.”117  Kickstarter similarly 
 
 114.  The Grand Paradise, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/thirdrailprojects/the-grand-paradise (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 115. Go Commando with Dear Kate Yoga Pants, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1527229560/go-commando-with-dear-kate-
yoga-pants (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 116.  For this reason, Kickstarter and its kin are deemed “reward-based 
crowdfunding” in the relevant literature.  See, e.g., Décarre & Wetterhag, supra 
note 111, at 6. 
 117.  Philip Reed, Five Reasons I Back Kickstarter Projects, BATTLEGRIP.COM 
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.battlegrip.com/five-reasons-i-back-kickstarter-
projects/. 
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highlights that while some funders are “motivated to pledge by a 
project’s rewards,” others are motivated by aims like “supporting a 
new effort from someone they’ve long admired,” and, in each 
instance, a commitment of support is a way to “pledg[e] . . . support 
to a creative idea that [the funder] want[s] to see exist in the 
world.”118 
The range of projects is far more diverse and colorful than the 
range of loan opportunities one typically can find on a P2P platform, 
and the overall process of reviewing options is a very different 
experience for the would-be Kickstarter funder than the would-be 
P2P lender.  Reviewing potential loans on Lending Club entails 
sorting through a lot of numbers, letter credit ratings assigned by 
the platform, and some additional information, which today tends to 
be quite limited and dry.  The Kickstarter interface, by contrast, 
takes a user into a visually rich and stimulating environment full of 
videos, pictures, and stories.  This is relevant to the analysis here as 
it highlights that the service Kickstarter is providing to both 
funders and entrepreneurs has dimensions that have little to do 
with the capital exchanged.  In order to explore further, it is helpful 
to consider some of the types of projects that get proposed. 
Some projects are small- to medium-scaled endeavors in the 
arts.  For example, “The Being of Nothingness Project” is a proposal 
for a “7.20 min dance film of the 2013 creation Being and 
Nothingness (Part 1), set on Prima Ballerina Greta Hodgkinson and 
choreographed by Guillaume Côté.”119  Supporting material included 
a video with a discussion by the creators, dance clips, and reviews of 
the dance when it was performed live.  Funders providing $10 
received “THANKS!” from the creators, while those providing $200 
were treated to a personal “thank you” on the creator’s Twitter 
handle, unlimited viewing access to the video upon release, 
recognition as a ‘Supporter’ in the film credits, and “an autographed 
pointe shoe from Greta Hodgkinson.”120  The project, which aspired 
to raise at least CAD $14,900, exceeded its goal and raised CAD 
$19,408.121 
In these instances, Kickstarter is making patronage of the arts 
accessible even to those with modest amounts to give while also 
providing supporters with preferential access to the project created 
or its creators.  From the perspective of the creators, obtaining 
funding in this way can also serve as a marketing device, a 
 
 118. Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Sept. 
11, 2015). 
 119. The Being and Nothingness Project, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/740176627/the-being-and-nothingness-
project/description (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. 
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mechanism to broadcast information about the undertaking to a 
receptive audience and to build enthusiasm for the project in the 
process.122  Particular features of the Kickstarter site, like the 
ability of a funder to broadcast through various forms of social 
media her decision to fund a project, amplify these effects, enabling 
the funders to advertise their patronage while simultaneously 
spreading information about, and endorsing, the 
project.  Kickstarter also serves as a valuable mechanism for 
creators to gauge the level of interest in a proposed project.  When a 
project fails to achieve its minimum funding goal—which precludes 
the creators from receiving even the funds that have been offered—
the entrepreneurs learn valuable information about the degree of 
interest in the project.  While it may be disappointing for a creator 
to learn that there is little interest in the short documentary he was 
hoping to make with funds from Kickstarter, the filmmaker may be 
well served to learn this before undertaking the project than after 
investing his own money and time in it. 
At other times, the exchange is more akin to a sale, contingent 
upon the project being funded and the good created.  For example, 
when DrinkTanks, a small company in Bend, Oregon, that aims to 
“revolutionize personal beer containers,”123 sought to create a new 
product that would be the “world’s largest growler & personal keg,” 
it turned to Kickstarter.124  To encourage would-be funders to give 
money to support the development of the proposed 128-ounce 
Juggernaut Growler, the company included a video featuring the 
company’s founder and CEO, in a plaid shirt and baseball cap, 
explaining his vision and drinking beer with friends.  The company 
also promised different types of goods depending on the level of 
support provided.  Funders providing twenty-five dollars would 
receive their choice of a branded baseball cap or fitted tee, while 
early funders who provided ninety-nine dollars or more received a 
Juggernaut Growler in their choice of “12 stylish finishes” along 
with a Kegulator that could be attached to provide carbonation.125 
While the nature of the exchange for these types of projects is 
more akin to a retail sales transaction than patronage of the arts, 
the benefits that inure to both the funder and the entrepreneur go 
beyond the exchange of capital in similar ways.  The entrepreneur 
gets feedback about the market demand for the proposed project 
 
122 Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus, Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The 
Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter 26 (UNC Kenan-Flagler, Working 
Paper No. 2013-15, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234765. 
123 About Us, DRINKTANKS, http://www.drinktanks.com/about-us/ (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2015). 
 124  DrinkTanks Offers the World’s Largest Growler & Personal Keg, 
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/584321487/drinktanks-
offers-the-worlds-largest-growler-and-p (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 125.  Id. 
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while also generating publicity and demand when a project is 
positively received.  Similarly, the funders usually commit at levels 
that allow them to obtain prototypes or other tangible goods related 
to the project proposed.  Just as in other sales transactions, the 
commitments likely indicate that the subjective value that the 
funder places on the good exceeds the amount he is willing to 
commit to the undertaking.  The transaction is still capital raising—
the creator is seeking funds in order to pursue a particular project—
and because it is occurring at a point in time before the good is 
actually created, the person providing the funds is necessarily 
assuming a degree of risk that would not be present in a retail 
transaction.  Yet the process of raising capital is bundled with an 
exchange of other goods that are also valuable to the creator and the 
funder.  Also notable is that the party providing the capital does not 
receive an equity or debt claim in the firm or undertaking; the 
funder receives something in exchange, but not the right to a 
financial return on the capital she provides. 
The importance of Kickstarter’s capacity to incorporate capital 
raising into a thicker exchange that entails nonfinancial components 
is reflected in the increasing tendency for entrepreneurs who may 
have had access to financing through other avenues to instead raise 
funds through Kickstarter.  For example, a recent study of hardware 
start-ups suggests that Kickstarter may be starting to function as a 
complement to the angel investors or venture-capital firms that 
entrepreneurs in this space traditionally relied on for 
financing.126    The study found that using Kickstarter enabled such 
firms to delay seeking capital from angels or venture capitalists, 
while also garnering excitement and demonstrating their promise to 
potential investors.127  Based on interviews with more than eighty 
entrepreneurs who raised funds on Kickstarter, the author 
concluded that most entrepreneurs believed that “the biggest 
takeaway they had was in fact the [funders].”128  This is because 
those funders and others who contemplate supporting a project 
provide “comments, feedback, and FAQs” that can “shift[] and 
shape[] the entire direction of the company going forward.”129  From 
 
 126.  Matt Ward, Why Hardware Startups Should Screw VC and Go 
Straight to Crowdfunding, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 29, 2014, 10:55 AM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/11/29/why-hardware-startups-should-screw-vc-and-
go-straight-to-crowdfunding/. 
127 Id. 
 128.  Id.; see also How Much Venture Capital Are Kickstarter and Indiegogo 
Hardware Projects Raising?, CB INSIGHTS (Aug. 11, 2014), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/crowdfunded-venture-capital-hardware/ 
(finding that “Kickstarter-backed hardware projects have raised over $268M” 
from venture capitalists and that 9.5% of hardware startups raising at least 
$100,000 through Kickstarter or Indiegogo subsequently get venture capital 
funding). 
 129.  Ward, supra note 126. 
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the perspective of the author, this feedback and the changes it 
triggers is “invaluable and it’s something no venture-capital firm 
can replicate.”130  
B. “Locavesting” 
Another domain where direct connections between the suppliers 
and recipients of capital are gaining some traction is an activity 
known as “locavesting.”  Building on the “shop local” movement, the 
“invest local” movement encourages individuals to preferentially 
deploy capital to fund local businesses.  As explained by Amy 
Cortese, who coined the term, “[t]he idea is that, by investing in 
local businesses, rather than, say, a faceless conglomerate, investors 
can earn profits while supporting their communities.”131  Like the 
original paradigm of P2P lending, the movement arose in part to 
appeal to persons with capital to invest who were “[t]ired of . . . Wall 
Street,” and the aim was to provide investors at least some return 
on their capital.132  Yet, once again, there are differences. 
Locavesting was always about providing funders with 
something more than just an economic return on investments.  It 
also sought to facilitate the opening and ongoing operation of 
independent businesses, to forge stronger relationships between 
businesses and members of the communities they serve, to promote 
economic activity in a region, and to otherwise promote community 
engagement.133  
While some examples of locavesting arise from person-to-person 
interactions, technology is also playing a role in expanding 
opportunities for both would-be funders and borrowers.  For 
example, residents of Seattle who want to support local businesses 
can now do so through Community Sourced Capital, a crowdfunding 
platform through which residents can make loans to local 
 
 130.  Id. (noting that crowdfunding through a site like Kickstarter can create 
“a community of incredibly supportive and innovative early adopters”); Jing 
Cao, How VCs Use Kickstarter to Kick the Tires on Hardware Startups, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:03 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-08/how-vcs-use-kickstarter-to-kick-
the-tires-on-hardware-startups.html (“A crowdfunding campaign allows a VC to 
‘talk to customers, track return and/or failure rates, and then fund expansion 
with real data,’ said Barry Schuler, managing director at DFJ Growth.”). 
 131.  Amy Cortese, Locavestors, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2008, at 63. 
 132.  AMY CORTESE, 
http://www.amycortese.com/Amy_Cortese_homepage.html (last visited Sept. 11, 
2015). 
 133.  Anne Field, ‘Locavesting’ Meets Crowdfunding Meets Social 
Entrepreneurship, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2013, 10:07 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2013/11/24/locavesting-meets-
crowdfunding-meets-social-entrepreneurship/; Danielle Sacks, “Locavesting”: 
Investing in Main Street Instead of Wall Street, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 3, 2011, 
12:40 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1771064/locavesting-investing-main-
street-instead-wall-street (interview with Amy Cortese). 
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enterprises.134  Would-be lenders commit to support a project at a 
level between $50 and $250 and would-be borrowers can seek loans 
of up to $50,000.135  In its first year, the site raised “$175,000 in 
loans for 12 businesses from over 1,000 community lenders.”136  
Connecting to the broader picture, the assumption underlying 
locavesting is that many individuals with capital to deploy place a 
positive subjective value on living in a community with particular 
attributes or derive pleasure from feeling like they are helping 
particular types of businesses.  Some individuals may prefer to live 
in a community where there are a lot of small businesses and 
relatively few conglomerates.  Apart from moving, which may be 
quite costly and even impossible depending on a person’s 
circumstances, these are not goods that individuals can easily 
acquire or support in isolation.  Expressing these preferences 
through a willingness to accept a significantly lower economic 
return on capital invested may thus be a compelling combination for 
some investors.  While there are intermediaries, like Community 
Sourced Capital and local stock exchanges, that play a role in 
connecting the supplier and recipients of the capital, the nature of 
the relationship is premised on geographic proximity and a greater 
effort to promote a sense of connection within a 
community.  Relatively short intermediation chains are thus central 
to making the design work.  Whether locavesting will take off and 
how it might evolve in the process remains to be seen, but it does 
appear to be another area where direct finance may be gaining a 
foothold. 
IV. The Future of Direct Finance 
All of the different transactions described here, along with a 
host of others, fall under the general rubric of crowdfunding.  In 
each, the provision of capital remains central—individuals (and now 
others) are providing capital to other individuals or small-scale 
enterprises as part of an agreement that provides that they will 
receive something in exchange, and the probability that the person 
will actually receive the good promised often depends on the 
capacity of the entrepreneur to successfully undertake the project 
proposed.  Yet there are significant differences between P2P lending 
on one hand, and Kickstarter and locavesting on the other.  P2P is 
primarily a financial exchange.  While early adopters may have 
derived some nonpecuniary utility from knowing that they were 
providing a loan to someone who they felt deserved it, the rapid 
evolution of P2P lending and the increasing reliance of even 
individual investors on automated tools when making loans suggest 
that the nonfinancial dimensions were far outweighed by the 
financial ones.  The same is not true with respect to the typical 
 
 134.  Field, supra note 132. 
 135.  Id. 
136 Id. 
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Kickstarter or locavesting opportunity.  Locavesting is based on the 
premise that the persons providing capital are willing to forego some 
return or assume greater risk because that person providing the 
capital derives some nonpecuniary utility from the exchange.  The 
nonpecuniary dimensions are even more central to the exchanges 
that occur through Kickstarter, as even when the provider of capital 
expects something tangible in exchange for the capital provided, 
that person has no economic stake in the firm or project he is 
helping to fund.  That Kickstarter has been so successful suggests 
that there may be advantages to packaging the provision of capital 
in a bundle with these other goods and services.  Similarly, 
locavesting demonstrates the ways that bundling the provision of 
capital with other idiosyncratic preferences may enable retail 
investors to express preferences and acquire goods that are not 
readily accomplished in other ways.  This Part very briefly considers 
the theoretical and policy implications of the demise of P2P lending 
alongside the success of platforms like Kickstarter. 
A. Theoretical Implications 
While crowdfunding may seem like a new trend, it has deep 
roots.  People loaning money to people is far from a new 
phenomenon; neither is raising capital from persons who have a 
stake in an undertaking apart from the financial returns on their 
investment.  As Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler have 
shown in a wonderful account on the evolution of shareholder voting 
rights for many late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
corporations, “the principal shareholders were also the firm’s 
principal customers.”137  This is because “local merchants and 
farmers were apparently the most effective source of capital” at the 
time.138  Yet, Hansmann and Pargendler’s account also suggests that 
legal and other innovations during the intervening years help 
explain the decline of customer-owned firms and the prominence of 
investor ownership today.139  The overall account, which is not 
limited to the United States, suggests a progressive movement 
toward “business corporations” in which “shareholders . . . are 
generally investors whose primary, and typically only, interest in 
the firm is to obtain a financial return.”140  
Recent theory suggests that ongoing innovations may result in 
even more extreme unbundling.  For example, Charles Whitehead 
and Ronald Gilson suggest that “the continued development of 
increasingly complete capital markets, in which working capital can 
be separated from risk capital and discrete slices of risk can be 
 
 137.  Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of 
Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 
YALE L.J. 948, 951 (2014). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 991–1001. 
 140.  Id. at 1007. 
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separately transferred, pooled, and shared among market 
participants, has called . . . into question . . . the traditional need for 
residual shareholders, whose risk exposure spanned the 
marketplace.”141  The literature thus largely highlights the ways 
that increasingly robust legal institutions and financial innovations 
may enable ever-greater splicing of interests, which in turn should 
lower the cost of capital by allowing persons to hold just the slice 
that they are best suited to provide.  In short, the assumption has 
largely been that innovation should enable ever-greater 
specialization, and that will benefit all involved. 
The growth of Kickstarter as a funding model suggests that 
these analyses, while not wrong, are incomplete.  They accurately 
highlight the way that financial, technological, and institutional 
improvements enable interests to be separated into ever-more 
narrow components.  And it will often be optimal in light of these 
developments for rights and obligations previously bundled together 
to be unbundled and allocated in ways that optimize the different 
interests and institutional capacity of an ever-growing array of 
stakeholders.  In some ways, Kickstarter represents a point further 
along this continuum—entrepreneurs often go to Kickstarter to 
obtain capital for projects that they likely will not undertake 
without the fresh capital, and the ability to offer nonfinancial 
commitments in return may well enable fundraising that would not 
have occurred otherwise.  Yet among the reasons for an 
entrepreneur to use Kickstarter in lieu of an alternative mode of 
raising capital is that the site allows her to do more than just raise 
capital.  By seeking capital through a channel that is designed to 
simultaneously further other aims, like enabling the entrepreneur 
to learn more about the demand for her proposed undertaking and 
building excitement for it, an entrepreneur may be able to obtain a 
package of desired goods at a much lower price than she would be 
able to if she sought these various goods unbundled from the others. 
Locavesting, while still in its infancy, represents a particularly 
intriguing form of bundling as it illustrates the ways that bundling 
may be used to promote the creation of goods that are not otherwise 
easily funded through private mechanisms.  Many individuals today 
seem to place genuine value on living in a town with a high number 
of small, locally owned businesses or in a region with a vibrant local 
economy.  Yet, like many public goods, the challenges that regularly 
impede collective action may make it difficult for these attributes to 
be produced and maintained at the socially optimal level.  Bundling 
the creation of such goods with capital raising does not overcome the 
collective action challenges—even individuals who desire such 
public goods might be better off free riding on the efforts of others to 
 
 141.  Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: 
Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 231, 232–33 (2008). 
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support them—but it does provide an innovative way for persons in 
the community to support small businesses that might not be viable 
otherwise. 
The niches where direct finance appears to be taking hold 
highlight the ways that nonfinancial innovations may shape the 
future of finance.  Thanks to improvements in social media, for 
example, a person who decides to fund a particular venture or to 
support a local undertaking can immediately broadcast that decision 
to all of his friends, family, and followers through an array of digital 
networks.  In such an environment, the ability to couple capital 
provision with publicity that enhances the reputation of both funder 
and undertaking may well be more efficient than efforts to acquire 
these goods outside the capital-raising process, and such bundling 
might also enable the expression of preferences and the attainment 
of benefits that are not readily conveyed or captured in other 
ways.  The process of providing capital in the early stages of an 
enterprise might also enable funders to feel as though they are part 
of the undertaking—shouldering the risks and sharing in the 
gains—in a way that was rarely accessible to those with limited 
means prior to the rise of Kickstarter and similar platforms. 
Juxtaposing this brief examination with the changes that have 
occurred in P2P lending suggests that direct finance may be on the 
rise, but it is more likely to thrive when one or both parties enjoy 
nonpecuniary gains from the transaction.  It is along these 
nonfinancial dimensions that the presence of individuals, who know 
their own idiosyncratic preferences better than any intermediary 
and who can provide other information or goods that no 
intermediary can readily replicate, is most likely to yield sufficient 
value to outweigh the benefits that intermediaries can provide. 
The data points examined here are too few and too dynamic to 
enable any meaningful conclusions to be drawn about whether and 
where direct finance will be viable.  Nonetheless, the additional data 
available are consistent with the notion that direct finance is more 
likely to thrive when the exchange involves something more than a 
pure investment.  Another successful crowdfunding site, for 
example, is Kiva.142  The site works with non-governmental 
organizations and other organizations to identify persons across the 
globe who may benefit from microloans.  Lenders screen the profiles 
of would-be borrowers, choose how to allocate their funds, and while 
they typically earn their money back, they receive the satisfaction of 
knowing that they helped create credit and thereby opportunity for 
someone in need in lieu of any interest.143  Similarly, the failure of 
 
 142.  E.g., Verstein, supra note 33, at 513–17. 
 143.  Id.; see also Natricia Duncan, Crowdfunding Development: ‘Kiva’s Aim 
Is to Make Microfinance Easy’, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014, 6:13 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2014/jun/10/crowdfunding-for-development; Scott E. Hartley, Kiva.org: 
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P2P equity crowdfunding to take off despite the hype surrounding 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act does not bode 
well for its viability as a mode of financing, unless it can be used to 
simultaneously build excitement or provide firms something more 
than access to capital.144  
B. Policy Implications 
The main policy discussions about crowdfunding thus far have 
focused on how to enable crowdfunding despite the rigorous 
disclosure and other obligations that securities laws typically 
impose on any firm that seeks to raise capital from the public.145  As 
reflected in the JOBS Act and the SEC’s recently adopted rules, 
colloquially known as Regulation A+, there are efforts underway to 
facilitate crowdfunding.146  At the same time, it took the SEC years 
to promulgate rules implementing the crowdfunding provisions of 
the JOBS Act, and experts believe that the crowdfunding allowed 
pursuant to the final rules will “only make sense for more 
established companies seeking at least several million dollars in 
capital.”147   The question of how to appropriately balance the 
investor protection concerns, the value of enabling smaller 
companies to raise funds directly from the public and the other 
issues implicated in current debates about equity crowdfunding, 
while far from resolved, have been the subject of extensive and 
ongoing discussion among the SEC, academics, and other 
commentators.148  
The analysis here should contribute to that ongoing discussion. 
The SEC and the securities laws it enforces are likely going to 
impose frictions on any exchange in which rights that could be 
deemed a security are among those provided to parties providing 
 
Crowd-Sourced Microfinance and Cooperation in Group Lending 14–15 (Mar. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572182. 
 144.  See supra Subpart II.A. 
 145.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015). 
146 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see 
generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks 
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be 
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012) (discussing 
the impact of the JOBS Act on crowdfunding). 
147 Daniel Huang, Small Crowds Get Their Day in Investing Sun, WALL STREET 
J., June 18, 2015, at C3. 
148 See, e.g., Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
the Securities Act (Regulation A), Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 2015 WL 
1788375 (Mar. 25, 2015); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal 
Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway 
& Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011); Andrew A. Schwartz, 
Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457 (2013). 
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capital, but the speculations here also open up a range of other 
potentially interesting policy issues.  The trend of uncoupling the 
provision of capital from other dimensions of an undertaking not 
only affected the evolution of shareholder voting, but also the 
evolution of the institutions that evolved to support the capital-
raising process.   One reason the SEC is already so deeply enmeshed 
in these debates is that most capital raising in the United States 
now falls under its jurisdiction.  Consumer protection issues, by 
contrast, are typically addressed by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) and state consumer protection laws.  And, to the extent the 
law plays any role in patronage for the arts and other creative 
endeavors, it is typically through contract and state laws enabling 
the creation of nonprofit firms. 
There is meaningful overlap in the aims animating these 
disparate bodies and sources of law.  Concerns about fraud, for 
example, arise across these different domains and are likely to arise 
in connection with direct finance as well.  Whenever someone is 
giving money today in exchange for promises that will only be 
fulfilled at some point in the future, fraud is likely to be a 
concern.  In addition to being an issue with respect to which 
disparate bodies of law likely pursue a common aim, this is also an 
area with respect to which the current legal and regulatory scheme 
suffices. The FTC, for example, has already gotten involved in this 
space when it identified a Kickstarter campaign in which the 
entrepreneur used the money received for personal and other 
expenses unrelated to the proposed undertaking.149     
Yet there are also significant differences in these regimes, the 
aims they seek to further, and in the types of benefits cognizable in 
each.  The notion of market efficiency that animates much of 
securities law, for example, has no parallel in the world of patronage 
for the arts, and may even seem contrary to the spirit of such 
patronage.  When the return on an investment thus includes both 
economic rights and intrinsic satisfaction, it may become far more 
difficult for any single agency or actor to assess and understand the 
legitimacy of an exchange.   
A related issue is that even with the recent changes 
promulgated pursuant to the JOBS Act, these disparate regimes and 
the requirements typically imposed on the issuance of anything that 
might be deemed a security significantly curtail the types of bundles 
entrepreneurs can offer to potential funders.  In particular, 
entrepreneurs today cannot readily raise capital by offering 
packages of rights that include both nonpecuniary benefits of the 
types typically offered through Kickstarter and economic rights in 
the project that would enable funders to enjoy a portion of the 
 
149 R ebecca R. Ruizjune, F.T.C. Reaches Settlement in a Kickstarter Scheme, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2015, at B2. 
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upside should a project prove exceptionally successful.  This 
limitation may be justified by investor protection concerns and is 
likely mitigated somewhat by the capacity for an entrepreneur to 
engage in multiple rounds of capital raising from different types of 
sources.  Nonetheless, there may be projects that could get funded if 
there was greater flexibility across these different lines.  For 
example, a filmmaker who could promise capital providers the 
opportunity to be part of the creative process and a sliver of the 
upside should the film prove to be exceptionally successful, might be 
able to fund a project she could not fund if unable to offer such a 
bundle or forced to comply with even the more lenient obligations 
imposed by Regulation A+.   
Also noteworthy is that the fuzziness between these lines is 
creating problems even within the current regulatory scheme.  This 
is illustrated in funder responses to both extremely successful and 
exceptionally unsuccessful Kickstarter-funded projects.  When 
virtual-reality firm Oculus Rift was acquired by Facebook for $2 
billion after raising capital through a Kickstarter campaign and 
from venture capitalists, for example, many of the persons who had 
provided capital through the Kickstarter campaign were angry that 
the venture capitalists enjoyed “20-fold return on their initial 
investments” while the Kickstarter funders received nothing more 
than the prototypes and other goods they had been promised when 
they made their commitments.150  Kickstarter funders who 
supported a project to create a new type of espresso machine in 
exchange for promises that they would receive the machine once it 
went into production similarly rallied together in frustration when 
that firm followed a very different trajectory—failing to produce the 
promised espresso machines, and then just failing.151  That some 
funders are unhappy does not necessarily mean there are issues 
that the law should address, but these various voices of discontent 
suggest that consumers/investors may be as unfamiliar as 
regulators and other policymakers with the new paradigm embodied 
in Kickstarter and its kin. 
Crowdfunding and new forms of direct finance remain young 
and dynamic, making it difficult to foresee how these practices will 
evolve and the policy issues that will prove most pressing.   Making 
it easier for smaller firms to raise capital and otherwise ensuring 
that the disclosure and other obligations designed for larger 
companies do not excessively stifle the capacity for other types of 
firms and entrepreneurs to raise capital from the public may well be 
 
150 E.g., Jillian Berman, I Backed Oculus Rift on Kickstarter and All I Got Was 
This Lousy T-Shirt, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/oculus-rift-
kickstarter_n_5034511.html. 
151 E.g., Gideon Lewis-Kraus, ZPM Espresso and the Rage of the Jilted 
Crowdfunder, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 3, 2015, at MM61. 
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the appropriate focal point for current debate. Nonetheless, the 
analysis here does suggest that policy discussions focused solely on 
how to expand the scope of firms that can use crowdfunding to raise 
capital may miss some of the more interesting policy issues that 
direct finance might raise, and may inadvertently curtail the forms 
of direct finance most likely to create value that cannot be realized 
in other ways.  The benefits and drawbacks of exchanges that 
bundle equity or debt issuances with nonpecuniary rewards, for 
example, are topics that may merit more attention than they have 
received thus far.  Policymakers may also be better positioned to 
gauge the full range of issues at stake in such exchanges if these 
issues are explored by multi-disciplinary groups of regulators who 
may be attuned to different benefits and challenges. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to a long-standing trend in the opposite direction, 
recent innovations have enabled more direct transacting between 
the suppliers and recipients of capital.  Many of the social and 
technological advances driving this trend in other domains have also 
started to transform finance, leading many to hope that we may be 
on the dawn of a new era of direct finance.  The rapid evolution of 
P2P lending suggests that the promise of a world in which 
individuals regularly exchange capital among themselves with little 
aid from established financial intermediaries is unlikely to be 
realized anytime soon.  Intermediation chains remain long and 
complex, and institutional investors continue to enjoy a number of 
regulatory and other advantages over individuals seeking to invest 
funds in productive undertakings.  Yet there are also indications 
that direct finance may yet thrive.  Particularly as technology is 
harnessed to couple the provision of capital with publicity or other 
goods or services, the suppliers and recipients may each derive 
additional benefits upon which they place unique subjective 
values.  Once the exchange takes on these additional dimensions, 
the benefits of direct finance may outweigh the other factors that 
weigh in favor of longer chains.  Ultimately, these gains may be 
realized only if regulators are willing to go outside of their comfort 
zones and work across agency bounds to understand the benefits 
and drawbacks of such bundling. 
 
